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the contingent imperatives of human flourishing as opposed to the intrinsic nature of actions. This comes even clearer into view when one brings
divine commands into play, as the command of God immediately implies
that actions are, in fact, not intrinsically good—a point which generates the
Euthyphro dilemma in the first place. From an overtly Christian perspective, such as Evans’s Kierkegaardian one, the motivation to understand
moral obligations in fundamentally deontological terms is lost. As Evans
has developed Kierkegaard’s position, God gives us commands (which
really amount to just one) so that we love God, as opposed to merely obey,
and thereby fulfill our telos as individuals created by God. This is precisely how Evans sidesteps traditional objections to divine command theory,
but this is essentially a version of Aquinas’ answer as well. Subsequently,
I doubt whether Evans will change the mind of anyone who comes to the
book staunchly committed to a virtue approach to moral norms, but they
may find new and creative ways to articulate and defend their position.
Conclusion
In both books Evans is a careful and appreciative, but at times critical,
interpreter of Kierkegaard, who capably brings Kierkegaard’s thought to
bear on contemporary issues in philosophy. Evans remains conscious that
he is offering us a particular reading of Kierkegaard and that no reading of
Kierkegaard—including his—is incontestable. The result is a Kierkegaard
whose views cannot be ignored by analytic philosophers interested in contemporary questions in philosophy of religion, ethics and meta-ethics.

Persons: Human and Divine, edited by Peter van Inwagen and Dean Zimmerman. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2007. Pp. viii + 380 pages, $99.00 hardback, $35.00 paperback.
C. G. WEAVER, Chicago State University, Northern Illinois University
All essays within this anthology appear for the very first time, save section
one of Alvin Plantinga’s “Materialism and Christian Belief.” Dean Zimmerman’s introduction provides a succinct and insightful discussion of
theology and its relationship to analytic philosophy (particularly analytic
metaphysics). He explains how analytic philosophy is no longer the enemy of theology, and then just before summarizing each chapter, remarks
that the spirit of the volume is very much in line with analytic philosophy
that is the friend of theology.
Idealism
The more substantive portion of the volume starts with a rather interesting section on Idealism. In “Idealism Vindicated,” Robert Adams explains
that one of the main reasons why Idealism is currently rejected by many
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philosophers is because of its inability to defend an idea of soulless substances. Adams tries to provide just such a defense. First, he admits that he
is a mentalist, musing that everything that is real “is sufficiently spiritual in
character to be aptly conceived on the model of our own minds, as experienced from the inside” (p. 35). But Adams also thinks that primary qualities
of objects are qualities of consciousness. The mind has properties like having
certain sensory images, and/or sensory states. From secondary qualities
that present themselves in the sensory images, the mind derives certain
primary qualities that are beyond a mere formal or structural character.
And from these secondary qualities, the mind derives primary qualities,
i.e., qualities of consciousness. By this, Adams does not mean to say that the
things in themselves which are the objects of sensory evaluation by thinking
substances have these qualities of consciousness unabhängig. What makes
a thing, das ding an sich, is possessing qualities of consciousness that are in
some way dependent upon the thinking substance (hence “mentalism”).
In “The Self and Time,” Robinson argues that persons are not essentially temporally located. Robinson makes a series of distinctions. First,
a manifest image, he says, possesses certain sensible qualities different
from the ones possessed by the scientific image. Second, the manifest image time (MIT) is said to possesses both A and B-series features. Third, the
scientific image time (SIT) is the time of the four-dimensional space-time
and of individuals as Minkowskian space-time worms. Robinson assumes
from the outset that the human person is immaterial and simple. He also
assumes that the essence of the self is consciousness. An implication of
these assumptions is that the self is never unconscious. But surely there
are times at which the self is not conscious, thus by way of reductio, Robinson believes we are forced into answering the question, “how could a conscious subject endure through time at periods when she is not conscious?”
by saying that with respect to MIT, the knowing conscious subject does not endure through time. As a result of this thesis, Robinson admits that the manifest image is a construct from experiences of individual knowing subjects.
Thus, the time of the manifest image is not primitive but is in some way
dependent upon the knowing subject. One wonders whether or not Robinson
leaves himself open to fairly standard criticisms of b-theoretic views of
temporal becoming here. For if such views of the phenomenology of temporal becoming are true, then such becoming would be dependent upon
the knowing subject (per Robinson’s position). But as William Lane Craig
and others have argued, it seems that even the illusion of temporal becoming involves the experience of one moment lapsing and another subsequently arising. Thus, the phenomenology of illusory temporal becoming
presupposes temporal becoming. How then is such becoming dependent
upon knowing subjects?
Dualism
In his short paper on “Cartesian dualism,” John Hawthorne examines several structural features of Descartes’s metaphysic, and tries to show that
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serious intellectual engagement with Cartesian philosophy of mind is
metaphysically fruitful. He derives from Descartes’s writings five axioms
about the nature of principal attributes, and then points out that some
typical issues related to Cartesian dualism are well-explained by a consideration of these five axioms, and that, given the possibility of the existence
of a thing that is strictly mental, it seems at least more plausible to suppose
that thinking things have parts that are non-extended. The essay is essentially exploratory in nature, and so there isn’t necessarily much to criticize.
Given multifarious Metametaphysics, and modal epistemologies, I wager
that some philosophers will disapprove of any kind of Cartesian dualism
no matter how it is dressed up, since such philosophers would affirm a
sort of modal skepticism re the relevant possibility claim about the coherence of non-extended substances.
According to materialism, human persons are material objects, and
nothing more. Plantinga’s “Materialism and Christian Belief” proffers numerous arguments against this materialist thesis, and also addresses arguments for its truth. Plantinga’s main argument against materialism is his
replacement argument. Through the contemplation of a particular imaginary episode, one is invited to see that it is possible that one could cease to
be for an extremely short amount of time. The idea is that one can survive
the sequential replacement of various parts of one’s body. This imaginary/
metaphysically possible episode is supposed to show that possibly one
can exist without one’s body, since it appears human persons can have
the modal property “able to exist when my body does not.” Given some
plausible logical and metaphysical theses about the nature of identity, it
follows that we human persons are not identical to our bodies. Plantinga’s
second argument is an argument from metaphysical impossibility. He argues that material things are not the types of things which can think, and
he particularly focuses on the inability of a material thing to have beliefs
with respective content. According to materialism, beliefs are no more
than neuronal events or structures of some sort (p. 108). Content is taken
by Plantinga to be a property of beliefs. Given that beliefs are neuronal
events of some sort, how is it that these neurophysiological aspects of our
brains could come to have content? At the end of the chapter, Plantinga
turns his guns towards the many objections to substance dualism. I find
Plantinga’s general dialectical strategy to be somewhat troublesome. For
me, the question of whether or not human persons are essentially nonextended substances hinges upon whether or not there are arguments
contrary to materialism which show that there is an explanatoral gap re
the hard problem of consciousness (or for Plantinga re belief and content)
that is itself essentially ontological in nature. Plantinga’s strategy seems to
be one which does no more than to motivate skepticism about the contemporary naturalistic hypotheses with respect to belief and content. However, providing even demolishing defeaters for such positions doesn’t
show that the relevant gap is ontological. Why can there be no naturalistic
account of belief and content re human cognition? Why should we be a
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priori non-materialists and/or physicalists? I do not think that a posteriori
considerations introduce the least bit of doubt about the fact that the gap
here could be merely epistemic.
Richard Swinburne’s “From Mental/Physical Identity to Substance Dualism,” walks the reader through a very intricate and new argument for
substance dualism. He supposes that one can think of events as things to
which the history of our cosmos can be reduced. Swinburne adopts what
appears to be Jaegwon Kim’s position with respect to events, that is to say,
Swinburne thinks of events in terms of property exemplifications (triples
featuring substances exemplifying properties at temporal indices). If one
were to know the “names” of these substances that are involved in the
respective events, one could deduce the history of the world. Something
is said to belong properly to the category of the mental if it is the case
that a subject has privileged access (p. 143). Swinburne then distinguishes
between the mental and the pure mental, where the latter is understood
to be that which contains no physical components whatsoever. For Swinburne then, there are pure mental properties, events, and substances (p.
160), which do not supervene upon physical substances. For Swinburne,
one prime example of such pure mental substances is the human person.
Swinburne tries to justify this conclusion by means of the introduction
and defense of not a few metaphysical categories.
In “Ghosts are Chilly,” W. D. Hart and Takashi Yagisawa attempt to
describe just how causal interaction between the mind and physical body
are possible, given substance dualism. They suppose that causation seems
to involve the flow of energy (a la Phil Dowe). Both Hart and Yagisawa
explain just how it is that such a flow of energy between mind and body
is possible.
Hong Yu Wong’s “Cartesian Psychophysics” proffers serious objections
to John Foster’s solution to the “pairing problem” in philosophy of mind.
Foster’s solution involves positing a type of natural nomicity which governs some mind-body relations. Wong’s argument is essentially one from
cost. Dualists need to realize the implications of affirming interactionist
psychophysics. Wong believes that Foster’s appeal to natural laws does
not do justice to the general nature of causation. If we really believe in individualist natural laws which governs “interactions” of the sort with which
Foster is concerned, then Wong believes we have to believe some rather
strange things about the nature of human bodies. The question, “how does
the soul feel its body?” is still unanswered from Wong’s perspective.
Materialism
In “A Materialist Ontology of the Human Person,” Peter van Inwagen begins his essay by making a series of insightful points about crucial metaphysical distinctions. Subsequent to this, he makes use of the metaphysical framework proffered for the purposes of addressing the mind-body
problem. He attempts to show how, given his framework, certain types
of dualism (as well as a particular identity theory about the mind-body
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problem) are false. First, he addresses Thomistic dualism, charging Aquinas with the belief that the soul is the form of the body, and subsequently
asking just why it could not be the case that the union of the body and the
form of the body are not simply the body simpliciter. Next, he examines
token-token identity theories, and property dualism, musing that property dualism cannot make sense of what it means to say that a property is a
mental property and therefore nonphysical. Van Inwagen asks the tokentoken identity theorist, what exactly it is that is thought to be identical,
and then admits that the answer to that question involves a commitment
to “events.” If there are no events, as van Inwagen seems to maintain, then
there really is no token-token identity theory.
Hud Hudson’s essay entitled, “I am not an animal!” completes the section on materialism. He, like van Inwagen, is committed to type of materialism though Hudson is most concerned with defending the thesis that
materialism does not entail that human persons are animals. Hudson tries
to establish this thesis wholly apart from giving attention to the debate
about bodily criterion for personal identity. Hudson’s defense is a “bigpicture/best candidate” approach to the defense of his thesis. Hudson
explicates and defends many assumptions for his best candidate justification, and then affirms that, given those metaphysical assumptions, the
best candidate for human personhood does not meet the persistence conditions of human animals. Another side of the general point of the paper
is an argument from cost. Hudson thinks that if you affirm that human
persons are human animals, you must believe in three-dimensionalism,
affirm a restricted theory of decomposition, take constitution to be identity, and deny the doctrine of general resurrection. This cost is too high
for Hudson.
Embodiment and the Value of Persons
Conversant with the work of Nicholas Wolterstorff and Robert Adams,
the late Phillip L. Quinn in “On the Intrinsic Value of Human Persons,”
argues that one can come to see just what is morally significant or valuable about human persons by pointing to horrifically clear instances of the
violation of such personhood. Quinn then argues that some such violations necessarily involve the body of the violated person. The important
implication per Quinn’s view is that the value of a human person involves
that respective person’s embodiment.
Lynne Rudder Baker, in “Persons and the Natural Order,” argues that
the value and dignity of human persons does not lie in the fact that such
persons have immaterial souls. Neither does such value lie in the fact that
these persons enjoy libertarian freedom. Rather, it is in the property of
“inwardness” that such value can be located. This inwardness is the ability to relate to things, via a first-person perspective. Baker leans heavily
upon a constitutional view of human beings, which stipulates that human
persons are wholly constituted by human bodies and are consequently
(on Baker’s view) human animals. With both the constitutional view of
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human persons and the property of inwardness in-hand, Baker suggests
that her account is thoroughly consistent with Christian theism.
Personhood in Christian Doctrine
In “The Word Made Flesh: Dualism, Physicalism, and the Incarnation,”
Trenton Merricks is concerned with how Christians should think about
the incarnation amidst the numerous views of the mind-body problem.
Merricks is clear about one major precondition for thinking hard about
this subject - we ought to look at Christ in such a way that He is related to
his human body in the same way each of us are related to ours. Merricks
believes that becoming embodied is necessary for becoming human (as
was the case for the incarnation of Christ). This fits better with a materialistic view of the human person. Merricks also thinks that an identity
theory about the mental and the physical accounts well for God the Son
having the body of Jesus and of no other human being. Thus, reflection
upon the incarnation should give Christians good reasons to become materialists re the mind-body problem.
Peter Forrests’s exotic essay, “The Tree of Life: Agency and Immortality
in a Metaphysics Inspired by Quantum Theory,” reflects upon particular
interpretations of quantum theory which imply that at the point of the
death of a person, the universe “splits” into two copies. In one copy the
person survives, and in the other copy there is a corpse. This interpretation
also suggests that the person in question survives her death more than once
(over-survival). Forrest explicates how the “worlds” of the Many Worlds
interpretation of quantum theory are “fibrous-universes” (pp. 316–317).
He then attempts to show how this metaphysic accounts for free agency,
immortality, and the Christian doctrine of a general resurrection.
In Michael Rea’s essay “The Metaphysics of Original Sin,” the idea that
a person is morally responsible for her actions only if the principle of alternate possibilities holds with respect to her actions, is labeled (MR). After a
very meaty explication of numerous theories of original sin, Rea concerns
himself principally with whether or not these multifarious theories are
consistent with (MR). Rea argues that all theories of original sin which
allow for true counterfactuals of freedom, and which also suggest that
free agents have counterfactual power over the past, are consistent with
(MR). Likewise with respect to any theory of original sin which allows
for non-endurantist views of persistence over time. Historically speaking,
Rea sees two plausible interpretations of Jonathan Edwards’ understanding of original sin that are consistent with (MR): (a) the Organic Whole
Theory, and (b) the Fission Theory. This would appear to be bad news for
Edwards, since he believed that (MR) was inconsistent with original sin,
and in fact, used this to show that compatibilism is true.
Brian Leftow’s “Modes without Modalism” is a very concentrated
chapter on Latin Trinitarianism and John Locke. The difficulty with Latin
approaches has been modalism. Leftow thinks he has a way out, viz., John
Locke’s view of personhood and mode. Persons, according to Locke, are
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things that exist by the occurrence of modes, and Leftow applies this to
the Persons of the Trinity, which are understood to be event-based in such
a way that they are founded upon a substance (p. 374). Leftow thinks that
the Trinity “arises” because God lives His life in three streams of events at
once. Each stream is the life of a person, and each person exists as the occurrence of a Lockean mode. In order to make this claim plausible, Leftow
appeals to temporary identity theories, and so is committed to a contingent identity thesis.
Overall, Persons: Human and Divine is a great anthology. The editors did
a terrific job of drawing together numerous themes with far-reaching implications for ethics, philosophy of religion, philosophy of action, philosophical theology, and of course philosophy of mind.

Getting Even: Forgiveness and Its Limits by Jeffrie G. Murphy. New York:
Oxford University Press, 2003. Pp. ix + 138. Cloth $22.95; Paper $16.95.
PAUL REASONER, Bethel University
One approaches the task of reviewing Getting Even by Jeffrie Murphy with
some trepidation. With a title like that, what if Prof. Murphy does not
like the review and decides to get even? These worries are not entirely
misplaced, since he states, “Speaking (as almost any Irishman can) from
extensive personal experience as a rather vindictive person, I believe that
I have often gotten even with people by actions that were moderate and
proportional” (p. 24). But I will risk the review since this is a splendid
book in which Murphy offers a defense of vindictive passions and a plea
for a “cautious and critical commitment to forgiveness” (p. 38). From the
title of the book, Getting Even: Forgiveness and Its Limits, one might think
that he is simply offering a defense of vindictiveness and praise for getting
even, but the overall tone of the book is more balanced—indeed, Murphy is careful to say that he is only offering two cheers (not three) for
vindictiveness (p. 26), and his study of vindictive passions leads us into
a deepened understanding of forgiveness. Murphy has published many
pieces on forgiveness (including Forgiveness and Mercy, co-authored with
Jean Hampton) and here he continues some of his previous themes and
examines new ones as well. A strong bibliography, with some of the entries grouped topically, will also serve readers well.
Getting Even is framed in terms of the question of how we should respond to evil. Much of the book, as indicated in the title, is concerned
with two possible responses to evil—vindictiveness and forgiveness—and
their proper place and balance. While framing the response to evil in this
way suggests that one is either entertaining vindictive passions or forgiving, Murphy recognizes responses to evil between those two options, for
example simply being hurt or disappointed by wrong done to one (p. 3).

